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Abstract
Penelope Maddy’s Second Philosophy is one of the most well-known ap-
proaches in recent philosophy of mathematics. She applies her second-philosophical
method to analyze mathematical methodology by reconstructing historical cases
in a setting of means-ends relations. However, outside of Maddy’s own work,
this kind of methodological analysis has not yet been extensively used and an-
alyzed. In the present work, we will make a first step in this direction. We
develop a general framework that allows us to clarify the procedure and aims
of the Second Philosopher’s investigation into set-theoretic methodology; pro-
vides a platform to analyze the Second Philosopher’s methods themselves; and
can be applied to further questions in the philosophy of set theory.
1 Introduction
In Defending the Axioms, Maddy [2011] applies her position of Second Philosophy to
set theory. In Second Philosophy, Maddy [2007] elaborates this position by describing
the work of a certain idealized enquirer, the Second Philosopher persona:
[The Second Philosopher has] good reason to pursue mathematics herself,
as part of her investigation of the world, but she also recognizes that it
is developed using methods that appear quite different from the sort of
observation, experimentation, and theory formation that guide the rest
of her research. [Maddy, 2011, 39]
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Maddy notes that there are two types of questions for the Second Philosopher,
one about set-theoretic methodology and the other about the nature of set-theoretic
activity itself. The first question already encompasses quite a wide array of topics:
The Second Philosopher wants to learn about set-theoretic methodology from a broad
point of view and therefore considers not only localized methods (like specific theorem
proving techniques), but also more general approaches (like adopting axioms). The
second question, about the nature of set-theoretic activity itself, is based upon the
results acquired by answering the first question. Maddy here develops the positions
of Thin Realism and Arealism, which, she argues, are interchangeable and equally
correct.
Although the questions of the second type seem to be the philosophically “richer”
option, in this article we will concentrate on the first group of questions. One reason
for this focus is that little has been done on this beside Maddy’s own work.1 More
to the point, we know of no works that use Maddy’s account of Second Philosophy
to further investigations into the philosophy of set theory.2 We feel that this is
due to the underdeveloped status of central notions and motivations of the Second
Philosopher’s approach to set theory and we would like to contribute clarification to
increase the usability of Maddy’s approach. As we will show in section 5, there is
potential for further work in this direction.
Another reason for focusing on the first group of questions is that they are a cru-
cial prerequisite when considering subsequent discussions, like Maddy’s philosophical
positions developed in the second type of questions, as well as her work on the uni-
verse/multiverse debate [as e.g. in Maddy, 2017]. Here a meta-analysis of the Second
Philosopher’s methods will be a useful tool to get a clear picture on how moves, such
as excluding heuristic reasoning, influence the Second Philosopher’s analysis, as well
as on what the limitations of her methodology are and how it can be changed.
In this article, we propose a general procedural framework for the Second Philoso-
1The articles that refer to Maddy [2011] are mostly concerned with questions of the second type
or more general considerations into the naturalistic nature of Second Philosophy.
2One exception may be Ternullo [2019] on the evaluation on multiverse accounts according
to Maddy’s philosophical approach. However, he does not focus on framing the philosophical
methodology itself, but rather on Maddy’s arguments in the so-called universe/multiverse debate.
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pher’s investigation into set-theoretic methodology, i.e. a framework for her own
methodology. We do so by developing Maddy’s exemplifying descriptions in Maddy
[2011] and [Maddy, 1997] into a general framework. This exercise has three aims.
We want to
A) provide clarification on the use of central notions and aims in Maddy’s work;
B) facilitate a general analysis of the second-philosophical investigation into set-
theoretic methodology; and
C) increase the applicability of this investigation for further work in the philosophy
of set theory.
We will show that providing such a framework is not at variance with the Second
Philosopher’s stance and we will give examples on how the framework can be used
to further investigate open questions in the philosophy of set theory. Also note that
we will work on two different levels of analysis: Aims (A) and (B) are concerned
with studying the very methods of the Second Philosopher (with respects to her in-
quiry into mathematics), whereas goal (C) is concerned with the Second Philosophy’s
actual application to set theory.
We address aim (A) in section 2 by clarifying how we can provide a general pro-
cedural framework for Second Philosophy while at the same time clarifying central
relevant notions. In section 3 we examine in detail Maddy’s case study of Cantor’s
introduction of sets as given in Maddy [2011], contrast the latter with her case study
of Zermelo’s defense of the Axiom of Choice and, finally, propose a first schema for
her procedure. Here we are interested in the specific details of a second-philosophical
analysis. We then use this first rundown to formulate the general procedural frame-
work in section 4. We show that it is indeed a framework for Second Philosophy and
that it can accommodate possible changes in the Second Philosopher’s methodology
itself. We also address the possibility of separating Second Philosophy from Maddy’s
description of it. We therefore provide a platform for a general analysis, thereby
addressing aim (B). Section 5 shows how we can use the framework to further appli-
cations of a second-philosophical analysis of set-theoretic methodology and to outline
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how this can impact discussions in the philosophy of set theory. This will a (first)
answer to how we can achieve aim (C).
2 Some comments on meta-philosophy
In this section we address aim (A) from above, namely, the clarification of central
notions and issues in Maddy’s work on Second Philosophy. This includes the general
question of whether we should give a general procedure at all, as well as clarifying
Maddy’s terminology and introducing the central method of means-ends relations.
2.1 Is a procedural framework desirable?
Here we want to address the question if it is at all in the interest of Second Philosophy
to provide a generalized procedure as propose in this article. Maddy [2007, 1-2] herself
points out that Second Philosophy not only “has no theory”, but also states that its
methods will remain “without any definitive way of characterizing exactly what that
term entails”. Instead, she goes on to describe through examples how an idealized
inquirer, the Second Philosopher persona, is supposed to work. She then concludes:
Though ‘Second Philosophy’ is never explicitly defined in all this, I hope
that Parts I and II [of [Maddy, 2007, I, II]] provide enough guidance for
at least some sympathetic readers to get the hang of how to carry on.
[Maddy, 2007, 4]
Maddy [2011, 39] makes this even more explicit: “Indeed any attempt at a once-
and-for-all characterization of our inquirer’s methods would run counter to the ever-
improving, open-ended nature of her project.” But, Maddy also states that the
Second Philosopher “looks into the matter of how and why the methods she and others
use in their inquiries work when they do and don’t work when they don’t” [2011,
38]. The possibility of evaluating the Second Philosopher’s methods presupposes the
possibility of making them more explicit.
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One main aim in the paper is exactly this: making the Second Philosopher’s
methodology, as currently stands, more explicit and make it amenable to a general
analysis. We will show in section 4.3 that our framework provides a more explicit
presentation of the second-philosophical methodology while at the same time being
flexible enough not to impede the ever-improving, open-ended nature of the Second
Philosopher’s project. It might even be possible to use the framework to distinguish
between Second Philosophy and Maddy’s interpretation of it. Maddy [2007, 3] her-
self hints at such a possibility when writing that “one might sign on as a Second
Philosopher while thinking I’ve gone astray in my pursuit of the particulars”.3
2.2 Methodology and practice
First, it is crucial to note that Maddy’s understanding of the notion ’set-theoretic
methodology’ differs from other such understandings in the philosophical literature.
Maddy includes the whole setup of set theory in it, going back as far as set theory’s
fundamental assumptions. While many set theorists would not talk about ‘adopting
axioms’ as a method they use to pursue set-theoretic research, this is one of the most
important parts of set-theoretic methodology in Maddy’s view, because the adopted
axioms delineate what is allowed in a proof and what is not. Typical questions about
set-theoretic methodology are: “[W]hat are the proper grounds on which to introduce
sets, to justify set-theoretic practices, to adopt set-theoretic axioms?” [Maddy, 2011,
41] The reason for this very broad interpretation of set-theoretic methodology also
lies in the goal of Maddy’s investigation, namely, to answer philosophical questions
of the second type, as pointed out in section 1. In the following, we will use the
term ‘set-theoretic methodology’ to include mathematical methods of set theory (like
forcing, transfinite induction, etc.) as well as the more foundational ones included
by Maddy.
Second, it is also helpful to note that Maddy uses the term “set-theoretic practice”
in a different way than the term “mathematical practice” is used for example in the
3See also Rittberg [2016, Chapter 6], where he discusses the possibility of “stripping away the
idiosyncrasies of Maddy’s investigations” [2016, 138].
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context of the philosophy of mathematical practice. For one, when discussing case
studies, she mainly refers to published material, therefore concentrating on what
could be called “the front” of mathematical practice.4 This raises the question of the
Second Philosopher’s adequate description of practice. For example, Rittberg [2016,
137] argues “that the Second Philosophical argument for UNIFY does not lead to a
faithful description of contemporary set-theoretic practice”.
The difference does not lie only in the source material used, but also in how
this material is used for (second-)philosophical considerations. The most obvious
example here is probably the use of heuristic reasoning. As we will see in section
4.2, Maddy excludes heuristic reasoning from set-theoretic methodology—not in the
sense that set theorists should not use heuristic reasoning, but on the ground that
such reasoning should not inform our philosophical investigations into the nature
of set-theoretic activity.5 This assessment would not be shared by authors such as
Francois and Bendegem [2010].6
However, what she does share with many of the proponents of the philosophy of
mathematical practice is the reliance on historical material and analysis. She is, for
example, seen as furthering the practical turn in the philosophy of mathematics: “an
exemplary case of the practical turn is the philosophy of Penelope Maddy” [Ferreirós,
2016, 23], which Ferreirós bases on the following principle: “Faithfulness to actual
practice, both presently and historically, is a key requirement for this kind of work”
[Ferreirós, 2016, 24]. This, of course, stands in stark contrast to the aforementioned
critique by Rittberg [2016].
4In contrast, many studies from the philosophy of mathematical practice focus on the so-called
“back” of the practice, as for example here in relation to explanation in mathematics: “The math-
ematical practice which we consider is drawn from the ‘back’ of mathematics. This contrasts with
the ‘front’ mathematical practice” [Pease et al., 2019, 17]. The distinction goes back to Hersh [1991].
5For further discussion on the role of heuristic reasoning see section 4.2.
6Cf. Francois and Bendegem [2010, 118]:
From the proof viewpoint, it seems obvious that different layers are required: the
search for a proof and related concepts involves heuristics, proof search methods. As
in many cases such techniques become interiorized [. . . ]. Thus, this proof practice
“feeds” a particular metaphysical view that supports and stimulates the mathemati-
cian’s search and that definitely should be taken into account.
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We think that one reason for this divergence of opinions lies in the ambiguity of
the relation between set-theoretic practice and set-theoretic methodology. From the
outset it could seem that practice is simply the more general term, with methodology
being a part of the practice. Then we could simply describe set-theoretic methodol-
ogy by collecting together all the instances of methods that come up in set-theoretic
practice and perhaps augmenting this with an ordering according to importance,
simplicity or whatever other feature we are interested in. However, this is not the
route Maddy takes. She still takes practice as the basis for her investigation, but
instead of just amassing together case studies of methods, she evaluates them. Only
methods that pass certain criteria are allowed to be considered part of set-theoretic
methodology and then, later on, be used for further philosophical consideration.
2.3 Means-ends relations
According to Maddy, she succeeds in isolating the proper set-theoretic methods, by
finding “an array of new methods for justifying claims, methods that appear to be
both rational and autonomous” [2011, 54]. We want to know how she manages to
identify those methods. Here Maddy gives advice:
In the cases we’ve surveyed, the community eventually reached a consen-
sus that the controversial method was admissible because it led to certain
varieties of mathematics, that is, because it was an effective means to par-
ticular desirable ends. Thus the positive counsel of history is to frame a
defence or critique of a given method in two parts: first, identify a goal
(or goals) of the relevant practice, and second, argue that the method in
question either is or isn’t an effective means toward that goal. [Maddy,
1997, 194]
Here Maddy observes how the community accepts a certain method (because it is
an effective means towards a desirable end) and she proposes to take this justificatory
structure as a guideline on how we should advance our own inquiries into set-theoretic
methodology. This guideline tells us to frame the investigations into methodology
7
in terms of a means-ends relation and test the means in the relation against its
effectiveness towards the goal. The formulation of the means-ends relation and the
evaluation of the effectiveness of the means takes place through historical analysis
and consideration of contemporary practice; for example. through a consensus of the
community.
Regarding the role of consensus: In the above quote it is presented as the outcome
of some concerted reasoning in the community. However, in our general framework
it can play two further roles: First, a consensus in the community can suggest a
method that should be incorporated into set-theoretic methodology (for example
the adoption of a certain axiom, as Maddy discusses it in regard to the Axiom of
Choice). Such a suggestion does not imply that a method can be included directly
into the methodology; we still have to frame it as part of a means-ends relation that
we will then evaluate by some criteria. This also means that it is unproblematic if
the method is only suggested by part of the community. Second, consensus can be
used as a criterion in the evaluation of the means-ends relation. In contrast to the
previous case, it is indeed important to figure out if the consensus is only partial
and what it is comprised of. Further, consensus cannot be the only criterion for
evaluation, for that would make the investigations trivial (a method is suggested for
investigation by consensus and then passes the threshold of acceptance because of
consensus). Thus it is important to keep these two roles distinct. In the following, we
will call the former the proposing role and the latter the evaluative role of consensus.
A note on terminology: As far as we can see, the means in the means-ends relation
is always a method, whereas the end in the relation is always a goal. We pointed
out at the beginning of section 2.2 the broad notion of methods at play; the same
will hold for goals, meaning they can “range from relatively local problem-solving,
to providing foundations, to more open-ended pursuit of promising mathematical
avenues” [Maddy, 2011, 52]. Moreover, being a method or a goal is not mutually
exclusive; a specific part of practice can be either in different mean-ends relations:
“we should expect that some goals will take the shape of means toward higher goals,
and that goals at various levels may conflict, requiring a subtle assessment of weights
and balances. But the simple counsel remains: identify the goals and evaluate the
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methods by their relations to those goals” [Maddy, 1997, 194]. Whether we want to
consider something as a goal or as a method is then determined by the context and
the role something plays in the means-ends relation under consideration.
At the end of this process, a method is accepted as part of the methodology if we
can show that it is an effective means towards a goal. Maddy also calls such methods
“rational” or claims that it is rational to include them into the methodology. As we
want to avoid the discussion about what role standards of rationality play in this
context,7 we will use the effectiveness criterion for a specific mean in a means-ends
relation to pass the Second Philosopher’s test.
3 Two case studies from Maddy
Our strategy in this section is the following: Building on Maddy’s own account of the
second-philosophical procedure, we analyze what she does in the case study on Can-
tor’s introduction of sets (3.1); we then propose a detailed schema for her method-
ology in this case study, from which we extract three key features. Subsequently,
we test the schema in a further case study, Zermelo’s defense of his axiomatization
(3.2).
3.1 Cantor’s introduction of sets
The analysis Maddy [2011, II.2.(i)] gives of Cantor’s introduction of sets is typical
for a second-philosophical analysis. The guiding question of the present section is
how Maddy interprets the historical and mathematical material in order to finally
identify a specific means-ends relation and then can conclude that specific methods
and goals found in set-theoretic practice are part of the justificatory structure of set
theory.
In her reconstruction of the historical case study, Maddy identifies the method
with the introduction of sets as new entities. She draws this from historical analysis,
7For elaboration, see Maddy [1997, 197].
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i.e. Ferreirós interpretation of Cantors work. Later on she implicitly uses the propos-
ing role of consensus, for instance when she assumes that Cantor’s introduction of
sets is a typical example for set-theoretic methodology [Maddy, 2011, 52]. She is
justified in the assumption insofar as the point can be made that today there is a
consensus on sets as accepted entities in the mathematical community.8
In investigating this method, she describes how Cantor was led to the introduction
of his definition of derived point set [Cantor, 1872] and explains why this can be
considered to be the moment of the introduction of sets as new entities. In the
setting of this case study, she identifies a specific research goal of Cantor, based on
her observation that “Cantor was engaged in a straightforward project in analysis:
generalizing a theorem on representing functions by trigonometric series” [Maddy,
2011, 41]. This suggests that, in general, the research goal of the involved agent(s)
can be interpreted as a goal of the relevant practice.
She establishes a means-ends relation in the following way: “a new entity—a set—
has been introduced as an effective means toward an explicit and concrete mathe-
matical goal: extending our understanding of trigonometric representations” [Maddy,
2011, 42]. Thus, when establishing the means-ends relation, she already evaluates
the method as effective, based on her prior analysis in which she points out that
Cantor could prove an important theorem about trigonometric series by using point
sets in this specific way. Finally, the method of introducing sets as new entities is
included into set-theoretic methodology.
We can now give a schema for Maddy’s procedure which is extracted from our
analysis of the Cantor example and her description of the second-philosophical method;
it is to be understood as a coherent interpretation of Maddy’s methodology. In the
following, M denotes the means and X denotes a goal:
We start with the observation that some M, often suggested by consensus, is an
established part of mathematical methodology. Two questions present themselves:
8Though there is an ongoing debate about the foundational role of set theory with respect to
other candidates such as category theory and homotopy type theory, the use of sets is widespread
over various (if not all) mathematical research fields, and the argument here is not about the
importance of set theory as a foundation, but on the mathematical notion of set and its introduction
into mathematics.
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What is the justification for M? (This is the research question.) When was M in-
troduced and by whom? (This is the methodological question.) As a next step, we
have to choose the material from which to draw conclusions: we consider historical
reconstructions about and source material of (one of) the event(s) surrounding the
introduction of M. Then we reconstruct the event and try to identify a goal X. The
central evaluation is carried out by assessing whether there is evidence that M is an
effective means for X. If not, we can try to identify a different goal and repeat the
assessment. If we succeed, we have found an argument in favour of M, if we fail we
should not consider M to be a justified part of set-theoretic methodology.
There are three key components of Maddy’s methodology that we extract from
this schema: First, the focus on a particular philosophical method, the analysis via
means-ends relations. Second, an evaluative component, which is used when assessing
the means-ends relation at hand and when identifying the goals. And, third, the use
of data both from contemporary practice as well as historical analysis to argue for or
against the choice of methods and goals and to investigate the overall effectiveness
of the means towards the end.
Let us now turn to one of the other case studies Maddy gives in Maddy [2011]
and see if we can find these three key components at work.
3.2 Zermelo’s defense of his axiomatization
Maddy [2011, 45-47] offers a case study of Zermelo’s defense of the adoption of the
Axiom of Choice, building on the evidence found in Zermelo [1908a] and Zermelo
[1908b]. Here we will not reconstruct the entirety of Maddy’s procedure, as we did in
the Cantor case, but only discuss the main differences between the two case studies.
The Zermelo case study adds two aspects to the conclusion drawn from the Cantor
case: it introduces a new method, namely the adoption of axioms and it discusses
criteria for choosing goals.
As to the first aspect, it may not be clear from the outset how the adoption
of an axiom is to be framed as part of a means-ends relation. For one, it is not
clear why the adoption of axioms is a method and not a goal that one aims to
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justify. To clarify this, let us consider how axiom acceptance is used in Maddy’s case
study. In the Zermelo case, the most convincing arguments according to Maddy are
the mathematical outcomes the adoption of an axiom brings about. These can be
framed in terms of clear mathematical goals: we aim to prove a certain theorem, we
stipulate that a certain mathematical feature should hold or not, etc. How can we
reach these goals? By adopting a certain axiom that allows us to prove the theorem,
by getting the mathematical feature to hold, etc. In this sense, the adoption of an
axiom can be framed in a means-ends relation: adopting an axiom is the means that
allows us to reach a certain goal. As we mentioned in section 2.3, this might not be
the only way to consider the adoption of an axiom, as means in one case can be ends
in another. But, if we want to assess whether they should be included in set-theoretic
methodology, we have to consider them as means, because the final evaluation of the
means-ends relation judges the effectiveness of means.9 Note that when presenting
the Zermelo case study, Maddy does not outright frame it via means-ends relations.
However, she does so in comparable examples like [Maddy, 2017, 303].
Secondly, Maddy discusses criteria for choosing goals by introducing the well-
known distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic justification. This is based on the
observation that Zermelo proposed both kinds of arguments in order to defend his
Axiom of Choice. Maddy assesses the two types of justification differently. While
extrinsic justifications are proper justificatory devices, intrinsic reasons are not and
may be devoid of justificatory power. 10
9Note that we do not claim that this framework of methods and goals follows the actual devel-
opments of the practice. The mathematical work (proving theorems, etc) might come first and only
later an axiom is put forward that will entail desirable mathematics. Nonetheless, we would then
say that the axiom is justified because it is a means towards this desirable mathematics and then
we consider again the same means-ends relation.
10In [Maddy, 2011], this can also be detected in her comment to the effect that
[Zermelo’s] claim is that Choice is [intrinsically justified] ...; we might now express
this by saying it is part of the informal ‘concept of set’. But, as we’ve seen, Zermelo
despairs of defining [the concept of set] with a precision adequate to the development
of set theory. Instead he appeals to a second standard of evidence [i.e. extrinsic
justification]. [Maddy, 2011, 46]
Here we have an example on how goals are evaluated, meaning that even before the final evaluation
of the means-ends relation takes place, goals have to satisfy certain criteria. In this instance, they
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For the method of adopting the Axiom of Choice in the Zermelo case, Maddy
mentions several goals, that this leaves us with two types of extrinsic goals: A math-
ematical one, as we need the Axiom of Choice in order to prove certain theorems
that mathematical practice (not just set theory!) wants to hold. The second type
of goal is foundational, i.e. to create more “productive science” and choose an ax-
iomatization that is “sufficiently wide to retain all that is valuable in this theory”
(Zermelo, cited in Maddy [2011, 46-47], cf. Maddy [2011, 52]). In section 4.2 we will
include criteria connected to extrinsic justification under the content-based criteria.
After studying Maddy’s representation of the Second Philosopher’s work in this
section, we will proceed to formulate a general framework in the next section.
4 A general framework for a Second Philosophy anal-
ysis of set-theoretic methodology
From the work surveyed in the last two sections, let us propose the following pro-
cedural framework for a second-philosophical analysis of set-theoretic methodology:
The core procedure is given by the method of analysing set-theoretic methodology
via historically informed and contemporary means-ends relations. This includes the
formulation of the method qua means, the identification of the goal(s), as well as
the final evaluation of the effectiveness of the method as means to realize the goal.
This core part is supported by an evaluative apparatus that contains the criteria
with which the Second Philosopher evaluates the choice of the methods, goals and
case studies. The evaluation is carried out with the help of historical analysis and
consideration of contemporary practice. The framework is procedural in the sense
that usually the Second Philosopher will formulate a certain means-ends relation
and then test the methods and goals according to the criteria of the evaluative ap-
paratus. If they turn out to be unsatisfactory, she may re-formulate them, resulting
in a different means-ends relation that again is evaluated—and so on. In the end,
she either reach a satisfactory formulation of the methods and goals, in which case
have to be extrinsically, not intrinsically, defined goals.
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we can proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the means; or we won’t find such a
relation. According to the outcome, she can add the method under investigation to
set-theoretic methodology or not.
In the following, we will elaborate on the two parts of the framework. We are
especially interested in providing a way to analyze the Second Philosopher’s method-
ology itself, therefore addressing goal (B) from section 1. We will show that one
major feature of the procedural framework is to provide a background in which we
can analyze the methodology of the Second Philosopher herself on different levels,
while keeping track of how changes in different parts of the framework will alter and
influence the overall methodology. This will also show that the framework allows for
enough flexibility to accommodate the “ever-improving, open-ended nature of [the
Second Philosopher’s] project” [Maddy, 2011, 38] and therefore address the worry
voiced in section 2.1.
4.1 The core procedure
The core procedure contains the methods used by the Second Philosopher in her
investigations into set theory. Building on Maddy [2011], we identified the analysis
using means-ends relations as the method used to investigate set-theoretic method-
ology. We discussed in section 2.3 what the method and goals consist in. For the
final evaluation, the method has to be effective to reach the goal in question. Pro-
viding that the means and ends satisfy the criteria of the evaluative apparatus, this
can be judged through the analysis of the historical case study and of contemporary
practice.
It is important to note that, by describing the core procedure in this way, we do
not claim that an analysis via means-ends relation is the only method the Second
Philosopher should use. Instead, as the Second Philosopher constantly reflects on
her own methodology, she is free to add other methods to the core procedure; change
details of how the means-ends analysis works; or even discard this method entirely.
Of course, a change in the core procedure would require a thorough analysis. In
section 4.3 we will develop this further and give some hints as to why some changes
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concerning the method of employing the analysis of means-ends relations might be
necessary to investigate contemporary set theory.
4.2 The evaluative apparatus
As we mentioned before, the Second Philosopher’s ultimate goal of answering ques-
tions about the very nature of set-theoretic activity requires a careful choice of means-
ends relations. While the choice of the the relevant setting by fixing a method and
goal could be attained by simply picking a method and goal from practice (per-
haps using the proposing role of consensus), here an evaluative component comes
in. For example, the Second Philosopher wants to avoid including tangential meth-
ods or methods that lead practice astray in some sense.11 This refers back to the
evaluative role of consensus given in section 2.3. Additionally, we have seen that
Maddy favours extrinsic over intrinsic justification. This gives rise to criteria that
say something about mathematical productiveness or relevance. But it also hints at
the possibility of a negative criterion on what methods and goals should not be.
Maddy provides one such negative criterion under the label of heuristic aid or
heuristic device. Let us give two examples to illustrate what this criterion is meant
to subsume:
Example 1
Dedekind’s paper on the natural numbers includes his belief that they
are ’free creations of the human mind’ (Dedekind [1888], p. 791). Given
the wide range of views mathematicians tend to hold on these matters,
it seems unlikely that [they] would all agree on any single conception of
the nature of mathematical objects in general, or of sets in particular;
the Second Philosopher concludes that such remarks should be treated
as colorful asides or heuristic aides, but not as part of the evidential
structure of the subject. What matters for her methodological purposes
11This also allows the Second Philosopher to reject examples of individual practices or the practice
of small sub-communities as template for general set-theoretic methodology.
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is that all concerned do feel the force of the kinds of considerations we’ve
been focusing on here; these are the shared convictions that actually drive
the practice. [Maddy, 2011, 52–53, our emphasis].
In this example Maddy uses the evaluative role of consensus in the community
to reject a particular group of beliefs as relevant for set-theoretic methodology. Not
only does she claim that there was no consensus about such beliefs, but even more,
that such a consensus would likely have never come about. She then uses consensus
to identify such heuristic aides, aiming at excluding such beliefs pertaining to indi-
viduals or subgroups of practitioners from the justificatory structure of set theory. In
the next example, we can see that consensus is not the only aspect of the “heuristic
aid” argument.
Example 2
[...] Linnebo and Pettigrew propose that the iterative conception justifies
ZFC [...]. My own view is that the iterative conception is a brilliant
heuristic device, but that the justification for the axioms it suggests [...]
rests on their power to further various mathematical goals of set theory,
including its foundational goals. [Maddy, 2017, 303, our emphasis]
Embedding this example in a means-ends relation, Maddy claims that choosing the
goal of “compliance with the iterative conception” for the method “adopting ZFC as
axioms” will not give rise to a usable means-ends-relation because the ends are not of
the right type; instead they should be mathematical and foundational goals. Here,
Maddy contrasts heuristics with subject-based considerations, i.e. mathematical or
foundational considerations in mathematics.
These two examples show that there are different flavours of the “no heuristics”
criterion and we argue that it is not one criterion after all. Instead, different aspects
of it can be subsumed under different criteria, depending on which flavour we want
to address. In Example 1, we claim that the “no heuristics” argument is actually
part of a consensus-based criterion. As we discussed the different roles of consensus
before, let us turn to Example 2. Here, we claim that the argument is part of what
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we call, for lack of a better term, a subject-based criterion. Let us give a broader
background for this criterion:
Judging from Example 2, one could think that the difference between heuristic
and non-heuristic arguments lies in philosophical vs mathematical considerations.
Maddy [1997] describes the role of historical analysis as including negative counsel
that “advises us that certain typically philosophical issues are ultimately irrelevant to
the defence or criticism of mathematical methods” [1997, 194]. At the same time, she
concedes that “[d]isappointing as this may be, I think there is no principled distinction
to draw between mathematics and philosophy [...]. At least, this isn’t the course I
take” [Maddy, 1997, 193]. Instead there are instances of philosophical considerations
that can and should be included into our analysis. One example is her argument
that questions, such as whether CH has a definite truth value, are still legitimate
even if they are independent from ZFC. They are legitimate because they can be
framed and answered in mathematical terms [Maddy, 1997, 194-195]. Also, Maddy
[2011] views foundational goals, like providing a unified basis for mathematics, as
legitimate goals and does not characterize them as part of heuristics.12 In the end,
it seems to come down to a fine-grained analysis of the considerations in question,
with the guideline that considerations are the more allowable the more they are
mathematically informed, i.e. tied to mathematical content or mathematical ways in
which they can be phrased instead of only concerning philosophical thinking. Coming
back to Example 2, this raises the question why the iterative conception should be
so decisively disregarded. There are ways in framing the iterative conception more
mathematically, for example as done in Boolos [1971].13 As we hinted at in section
2.2, there are also arguments to be made that heuristics indeed is an important
part of mathematical methodology and should inform further philosophical debate.14
However, in the following we will include the “no heuristics” argument, as it plays an
12For a comprehensive discussion of what foundational goals are, see Maddy [2017].
13Many thanks to Neil Barton for pointing this out to us.
14Notably in her very early work, Maddy [1988] does not use a “no-heuristics”-criterion. To the
contrary, she relates heuristics to extrinsic reasoning when she emphasises that also ZFC axioms are
supported by “’extrinsic’ (pragmatic, heuristic) justifications, stated in terms of their consequences,
or intertheoretic connections, or explanatory power, for example” [1988, 483].
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important part in Maddy’s work and the goal of the framework is to structure this
work.
Finally, let us list three criteria which we identified in Maddy’s work and which
are at play in the evaluative apparatus:
Consensus-based criteria15: “typical” [Maddy, 2011, 56], “natural” [Maddy,
2011, 85] shared beliefs that actually “drive the practice” [Maddy, 2011, 53].
Content-based criteria: part of the “evidential structure of the subject ”[Maddy,
2011, 53], “productive” [Maddy, 2011, 85], “methodologically relevant” [Maddy, 1997,
193].
Subject-based criteria: no heuristics16, no “philosophical” but mathematically
informed content (in the way detailed above).
Three remarks are in order here: First, the dividing line between these criteria
are not sharp. The idea behind the distinction between the first two criteria is that
consensus-based criteria rely on judgments of the practitioners, whereas content-
based criteria rely on the content being produced by the practitioners, like theorems,
proof methods etc. Of course, it could be argued that ‘relevance’ is also a consensus-
based criterion, however such ambiguities will not damage the general structure of
the framework.
Second, it would be interesting to find and analyse a method or goal on which the
criteria disagree. For example, what if a strong consensus emerges in the community
about a goal or method that the Second Philosopher dismissed as heuristic device?
Without being able to elaborate here, we think that the previously discussed case of
the iterative conception could be construed in this way. This goes to show that we do
not believe that the outcome of the procedural schema is guaranteed to be conclusive.
More than that, we perceive the possibility of an inconclusive outcome as a desirable
property of our framework as scientific practice is in flux and sometimes inconclusive
itself. It should therefore be reflected by an analysis into its methodology.
Finally, we can see all of the criteria at work in Maddy’s case study of Cantor’s
introduction of sets. As we pointed out in section 3.1, the consensus-based criteria
15Note that this refers to consensus in its evaluative role, not its proposing role
16[Maddy, 2017, 303]
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are met because sets as entities are regarded as a standard method in set theory. The
content-based criteria are also met: the whole mathematical system of set theory is
evidence for this. And, finally, the subject-based criteria are met, as evidenced by
the following observation: Maddy uses terms like “exists” or even “ontology” not
in “any philosophically loaded way: I just mean what the practice asserts to exist,
leaving the semantic or metaphysical issues open” [Maddy, 2017, 296, footnote 13].
So, when analyzing the method of introducing sets as new entities, we do not attach
a metaphysical claim to this method, in the sense that sets are introduced as objects
that “really exist”, a belief which seems not to be a potential candidate for overall
consensus. In this sense, no heuristics is involved in the method.
The procedural framework we have developed in the last two sections is modeled
after Maddy’s presentation of Second Philosophy. Our choice of criteria is guided by
Maddy’s analysis. However, we have also seen that some of the criteria can be called
into question. In the following section, we will show that the procedural framework
does allow for changes, for example in the choice of criteria. This opens up the
possibility to be a Second Philosopher without having to agree with the entirety of
Maddy’s interpretation of it.
4.3 Analysing the Second Philosopher’s methodology
In Section 2, we raised the question whether it is in the interest of the Second
Philosopher to provide a generalized framework in light of the open-ended and ever-
improving nature of her inquiry. In reply to this worry, we claimed that our pro-
cedural framework would be able to supply a concrete guideline on how second-
philosophical inquiries can be analyzed, while at the same time being flexible enough
not to impede the nature of the Second Philosopher’s project. In this section we
want to argue that we have succeeded on both accounts.
Changes in the framework can occur on different levels: For one, the content of
the criteria can change. For example, foundational goals could change, as indeed
happened with Maddy’s Final court of appeal17 that later seemed too restrictive
17“Provide decisive answers to questions of ontology and proof: if you want to know whether or
19
and were revised into Shared Standard and Generous Arena.18 Similarly, prac-
tice could produce a number of new results, showing a method to be productive that
beforehand was not.
We could also add or remove criteria or make the proposed criteria more fine-
grained. What our procedural framework does not allow for, however, is to get rid
of the evaluative apparatus altogether (as it is an integral part of the framework).
But this restriction does not present a problem for the Second Philosopher. She is
not only interested in describing the practice, but in evaluating it in a certain way,
separating relevant from irrelevant parts of the practice; this separation has to follow
some criteria, therefore there has to be an evaluative apparatus.
The same holds in an even stronger sense for the core procedure, as it contains the
methods used in the Second Philosopher’s inquiry. Still, we have the possibility of
introducing changes to the core procedure. Following Maddy’s interpretation of the
Second Philosopher’s inquiry, it only contains the method of analysis via means-ends
relations that is conducted through historical analysis and consideration of contem-
porary practice. The way in which we choose the means and ends is directed by the
evaluative apparatus; any changes here would reflect back to changes in the evalua-
tive apparatus, which we discussed above. This still leaves us with the possibility of
adding new methods. Indeed, in the case of science, the Second Philosopher already
has more than one method available to him (observation, hypothesis making and
testing etc.), so it is reasonable to assume that she could come up with more than
one way of analysing set-theoretic methodology. In the following we will provide an
argument outline for why adding a new method (or at least adapting the method of
means-ends relations) might be necessary.
We start with the following observation: There is one disadvantage to the de-
pendence on historical analysis, namely that we cannot use it when considering very
recent developments in set theory. Looking at the literature, historical analysis of
not a so-and-so exists, see whether one can be found in V; if you want to know whether or not
such-and-such is provable, see whether it can be derived from the axioms of set theory” [Maddy,
2017, 296].
18For a more detailed discussion, see Maddy [2017].
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set theory becomes rapidly scarcer for the time frame after the 1950s and 1960s.19
This is certainly not a result of historical oversight. Instead, if events are too recent,
historical analyses are not forthcoming. It might simply not be methodologically
possible at this point, as many historical sources are not yet available to the histo-
rian.20 For the perspective of an overall history of mathematics, this might not be a
problem; from the perspective of longue durée, fifty years may not even be a proper
historical subject matter. But if we want to consider contemporary practice, fifty
years is enough to drastically change a mathematical area both in its methods and
its research goals (for example, consider the time between the 1850s and the 1900s
in algebra).
As we have seen, the correct evaluation of the means-ends relation relies heavily
on historical analysis. But if we cannot address (roughly) the last fifty years, we lose
much insight into contemporary practice (especially in a discipline that is only little
more than one hundred years young). Can this restriction be overcome in some way?
Can recent set theory be made accessible to a second-philosophical analysis? We
want to give on outline for an affirmative answer—at least up to a certain degree.
The main role of the historical analysis in the procedural schema is to create
a test case for our intended means-ends relations. Here we can use a historical
account of the practice to search for suitable methods and goals and test them
against the criteria of the evaluative apparatus. We also use contemporary practice
as a control case, for example to check whether the criteria still hold, whether the
historical practice is still relevant, and so on. But if we don’t have historical analyses
available, we lose our primary source of test cases. To counteract this, we could try
to use contemporary practice as the test case. This is difficult, however, as we will
lack historical hindsight. For example, it will be more difficult to judge consensus-
based criteria, like naturalness, for very new methods, as naturalness is (at least to a
degree) connected to the community getting familiar with a new method. Content-
based criteria are also difficult to assess, as a method can show much promise but
19For example Ferreirós [2007] ends with a short outlook on the time immediately after World War
II; work in the 1960s is already scarcer, exceptions are scholarly work by Moore [1987], Kanamori
[2008].
20For example access to Nachlässe, correspondences, etc.
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de facto has not produced relevant results yet. And subject-based criteria are even
more difficult to judge: When mathematicians are in the process of proving and
formulating hypotheses, they heavily rely on heuristics and intuitions; some distance
to the work is needed to see what was actually mathematically necessary and what
was a crutch for thought that can be thrown away afterwards.
Nonetheless, we speculate that there is some work that can be done starting from
the vantage point of analysis of contemporary practice, namely by considering future
developments of the practice. The most immediate example in which considerations
regarding the future come up are mathematical hypotheses. To be sure, they don’t
have the same status as scientific predictions, as the eventual assessment of their
truth or falsity does not confirm or refute mathematics as a theory. But they can
help provide a future frame of reference to test means-ends relations.
Let us consider the following example: in Maddy’s case study of determinacy, she
quotes a speculation of Yiannis Moschovakis [1980] about the future developments
of determinacy hypotheses:
In his 1980 state-of-the-art compendium on the subject, Moschovakis ob-
served that ‘no one claims direct intuitions . . . either for or against deter-
minacy hypotheses’, that ‘those who have come to favor these hypotheses
as plausible, argue from their consequences’ (Moschovakis [1980], p. 610).
At that time, he concluded:
At the present state of knowledge only few set theorists accept
[ADL(R)] as highly plausible and no one is quite ready to believe
it beyond a reasonable doubt; and it is certainly possible that
someone will simply refute [it] in ZFC. On the other hand, it
is also possible that the web of implications involving determi-
nacy hypotheses and relating them to large cardinals will grow
steadily until it presents such a natural and compelling picture
that more will succumb. (Moschovakis [1980], pp. 610–611)
Here Moschovakis displays impressive foresight, as more have succumbed
in recent decades, on the basis of new discoveries.
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We can interpret this as presenting the following means-ends relation: The method
is identified with the adoption of (some version of) determinacy as an axiom; the goals
are future mathematical consequences of this axiom. We will be able to use future
content-based criteria (“argue[ing] from the consequences”) and future consensus-
based criteria (“natural and compelling picture”) to judge this means-ends relation.
Given this setup, can we use contemporary practice to build a test case for a
means-ends relation and then check it on the basis of a future test case? Unfortu-
nately, this is not so simple, as building future test cases will always commit us to
certain ceteris paribus assumptions: We have to assume that in the meantime noth-
ing changes the general picture, for example that no different axiom with similar
productive power gets accepted. Still, we have hope that such general issues can
be overcome in some way. This hope relies on the fact that it is already part of
mathematical practice to create such future test cases. One example for this is the
recent work by Bagaria, Koellner, and Woodin [2019], in which the authors formu-
late two possible ways set theory can develop depending on which horn of the HOD
dichotomy will hold. Also, in general mathematics it is common practice to explore
the consequences of some mathematical hypothesis when a proof is still lacking.
This is certainly only an outline of the idea of using future developments of
mathematics in the second-philosophical analysis. In order to develop a reliable
method, this outline has to be worked out in much more detail. We will have to
leave this as future work to be done.
In this section we described how the formulation of a general framework can
be used to analyze the work of the Second Philosopher. We have shown that the
framework is flexible enough to not impede her work and indeed provides a platform
on which we can clearly formulate possible limitations of her methodology. Finally,
we have given an outline of how the limitation of the reliance of historical analysis
could be overcome.
Concluding, let us note that we motivated the changes that can be implemented
in the procedural framework with the Second Philosopher’s motivation to have the
possibility to change her methodology. This also provides us with the possibility to
analyze a separation of Maddy’s interpretation from Second Philosophy itself. We
23
could, for example, not accept the criteria that are associated with the “no heuris-
tics” argument and try to argue that we are still conducting a second-philosophical
analysis. Of course, such an argument would have to involve a detailed analysis into
the contents of the procedural framework, but the fact remains that the framework
provides a platform for this kind of analysis to occur.
5 Applying the general framework
In this last section we want to show how the procedural framework can be applied
to new cases of set-theoretic methodology. We will give a short and concise example
in which we can watch our procedural framework at work. We will then conclude by
pointing out directions of further work that could be done by applying the procedural
framework in Second Philosophy and discussing how this can be used to address
questions in the philosophy of set theory. In this section, we will therefore address
point (C) of our general goals in section 1.
The constructible universe L is a fundamental object in contemporary set the-
ory. Introduced by Gödel to show the consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the
Continuum Hypothesis, and further investigated by Jensen in the 1970s, generaliza-
tions of it are studied in inner model theory. L is sometimes seen as a very natural
model of set theory, due to its canonical structure. Based on its importance for set
theorists, the Second Philosopher is interested in L and wants to understand its role
in set-theoretic methodology.
The natural historical case study for such an investigation is Gödel’s own work
at the end of the 1930s, such as Gödel [1939] and Gödel [1940]. Of course, Gödel’s
work has been studied extensively in the philosophical literature, however here we
will mainly follow [Kanamori, 2007] as we want to focus on his mathematical work
from a historical perspective.
Having established the setting for the historical case study, we want to figure out
which method to choose. When looking at Gödel’s works, we have an abundance
of possibilities: the method could be foundational, like “adopting V = L as a new
axiom” with a foundational or mathematical goal to match; the method could be
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more local, like “using Gödel’s Condensation Lemma” with the goal to prove GCH
in L; it could be more broad like “minimality arguments” from the fact that L is the
smallest inner model of ZF used in an abundance of mathematical theorems; and
so on. Not all of these methods will lead to a satisfactory means-ends relation. As
Maddy points out repeatedly, the method to adopt V = L is be excluded from her
analysis of set-theoretic methodology, as it contradicts foundational goals that are
connected to maximality considerations (in the form of large cardinals) [Cf. Maddy,
1997, III.6]. The historical case study could suggest a method like “work in (some
variant of) NBG set theory”, as Gödel indeed used NBG in Gödel [1940]. However,
when referring to contemporary practice, it turns out that this method should not be
considered as it is not methodologically relevant or part of the evidential structure
of the subject, therefore not fulfilling crucial content-based criteria.
Following Kanamori, we want to look at the method that is
arguable the central feature of the construction of L: [...] L is a class
definable in set theory via a transfinite recursion that could be based on
the formalizability of def(x) [...]. Though understated in Gödel’s writing,
his great achievement here [...] is the submergence of metamathematical
notions into mathematics. [Kanamori, 2007, 161]
Let us abbreviate this method as “the definability construction”; the goal sug-
gested by our case study is a mathematical one, namely “proving the consistency
of AC and GCH”. First, we have to check if we pass the criteria of the evaluative
apparatus.
The historical case study presents us with the curious fact that Gödel did use
this method in his [1939], but in the longer exposition [1940] he uses the method of
Gödel operations. Without going too much into the interesting relation between these
two accounts,21 we see with respect to contemporary practice that the definability
construction remained methodologically relevant, as it gave rise to a great number
of similar constructions (relative constructibility, ordinal definability and much more
general studies of inner models). It has therefore become an integral part of the
21For more on this, see Kanamori [2007].
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evidential structure of set theory. Additionally to these content-based criteria, the
method and goal conforms to consensus-based criteria (building a model up in the
way of the definability construction certainly counts as a natural construction). The
subject-based criteria seem to be fulfilled as well, as both method and goal are
mathematical.22
In comparison with the historical case study and contemporary practice, it turns
out that our candidate passes the criteria of the evaluative apparatus. Further, we
see that the definability construction is an effective means towards the end of proving
the consistency of AC and GCH (as well as other mathematical goals) and therefore
should be included in set-theoretic methodology.
Starting from this observation, the Second Philosopher could now turn towards
the general question of the role of metamathematics in set-theoretic methodology.
A first clue on this was given by Kanamori in the quote above. Baldwin [2018]
gives an account of a shift in model theory that is connected to the introduction
to metamathematical methods. To see if the same holds for set theory, we could
therefore use our previous observation as first evidence for a comparable shift in
contemporary set theory. Such an investigation would certainly be of importance
to the Second Philosopher when turning to her questions about the nature of set-
theoretic activity.
We see a further point where it could be interesting to follow the work on meta-
mathematical methods: Maddy [2011] wants to explain how the Second Philosopher
inquires into mathematics [cf. Maddy, 2011, 39]. She focuses on set theory instead
of general mathematics because she wants to investigate pure mathematics [Maddy,
2011, Section I] and assumes set theory to be a good foundation for it. We think that
the viewpoint of metamathematical methodology could be an interesting starting
point to revisit the connection between mathematical and set-theoretical method-
ology, as metamathematical methods seem much more prevalent in the latter than
the former. This will also be important if we want to transfer insights from the
Second Philosopher’s inquiry into the nature of set-theoretic activity to the nature
22Though it is interesting to note that this has not always have been perceived in this manner,
see for instance Cohen’s impressions recounted in Cohen [2002, 1087].
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of mathematical activity in general.
Last, in the current debate in philosophy of set theory, there are several ex-
amples that can be studied with the above developed procedural schema—the most
prominent of them being connected to the universe/multiverse debate. Maddy [2017]
defends a universist stance by arguing with the methods of Second Philosophy. Ter-
nullo [2019] argues to the contrary, mainly by addressing Maddy’s foundational goals
that she develops in [Maddy, 2017]. We think that by using the procedural frame-
work we can find some middle ground in the debate. Let us give a very short outline
of how this could be used:23 One important point in the debate concerns the status
of models of set theory. Very roughly: Multiversist positions tend to emphasize their
status as new objects in set theory brought about by techniques like forcing [See
for example Hamkins, 2012]. Formulating this in the “not philosophically loaded”
manner of the Second Philosophy framework, we could start an investigation into
the possible adoption of the method “models of set theory are introduced as new enti-
ties”. An investigation into this method will then occur in the setting of the historical
case study of the introduction of forcing by Cohen. We then choose a goal that he
pursued there, for example the proof of the independence of Axiom of Choice and
the Continuum Hypothesis. The main task will be to show that this formulation of
method and goal passes the criteria in the evaluative apparatus and that in the end
the method is judged to be effective towards this goal. Then it can be inferred that
the method of introducing models of set theory as new entities should be included
into set-theoretic methodology. One could subsequently investigate what this new
picture of set-theoretic methodology tells us about further philosophical considera-
tions, be it connected to Maddy’s positions of Thin Realism and Arealism or her
foundational goals. We think that such an investigation has the potential to build a
bridge between the principles from which Maddy draws her form of universism and
the focus on models of set theory from the multiverse side.
In this section we have shown how our general framework can be applied to
23To make the full case a detailed analysis is required that is too extensive for this paper. However,
the first author of this paper is currently preparing an article concerned with this issue [see Antos,
in preparation].
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investigate set-theoretic methodology in a second-philosophical manner. We have
also given hints on how such an investigation can be used for the discussion of
broader philosophical questions. Combining this with the possibility of changing
aspects of the Second Philosopher’s methodology itself, as developed in section 4.3,
we hope that this article contributes to further applications of Second Philosophy to
the study of set theory.
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